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Defending the Park System: The
Controversy Over Rainbow Bridge
MARK W. T. HARVEY

In the 1950s and 1960s the Colorado River entered the spotlight of the
United, States ' environmental movement. Beginning in the early 1950s,
with the proposed Echo Park dam in Dinosaur National Monument, conservationists from throughout the country fought against dams and reservoirs that threatened protected areas along the Colorado River and its
tributaries. Conservationists' success in stopping Echo Park dam and
later Marble and Bridge Canyon dams in the Grand Canyon proved to
be key episodes in the rise of the modern wilderness movement, marking the emergence of such groups as the Sierra Club, the National Parks
Association, and the Wilderness Society onto the national environmental scene.'
During each of these struggles, wilderness advocates called on the
public to be vigilant in safeguarding areas in the national park system.
They argued that Echo Park dam threatened Dinosaur National Monument, that Glen. Canyon dam and Lake Powell threatened Rainbow
Bridge National Monument, and that Marble and Bridge Canyon dams
would alter the flow of the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon.
The activists also insisted that the waters would inundate portions of
the national park and monument. Conservationists contested these dams
and reservoirs by warning that a cherished institution, the national park
system, hung in the balance, and that a critical issue was at stake: the
integrity of the national park system.
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This appeal to save the park system proved highly effective in galvanizing the public. At a time when legal means to oppose dams and
other development projects did not exist, conservationists relied on
rhetoric to win public support for protected areas and to solidify the
nation's commitment to preserving them. They lacked the legal weapons, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (implemented in
1970) mandating environmental impact statements, that were later used
with great success to delay or block many projects. Consequently, defenders of wilderness sought to raise public awareness of threatened
areas through their publications and public appearances, and by warning that a dangerous "precedent" could be set if a given dam and reservoir were built inside a national park.
This notion of a precedent was a rhetorical strategy that served a
number of purposes to those defending the national park system from
threatened intrusions. First, it drew attention to the perils facing some
of the grandest, most picturesque scenery protected within the United
States' national park system and warned the public of its imminent destruction. Permit any of these dams to invade parks or monuments, they
cautioned, and intrusions into other protected areas would quickly follow. It was the "domino theory" of environmental protection, and boundary lines were critical to the rhetoric: compromise a park's boundaries
just once, and it could never be restored. Moreover, any dent in a single
national park or monument would weaken the entire national park system and undermine all efforts to protect wild lands. As Howard Zahniser,
an activist in the Echo Park controversy noted, "the sanctity of dedicated areas" lay at the heart of wilderness preservationists' concerns. 2
In addition, such rhetoric bound together a sometimes fragmented conservation movement. Whether concerned with birds, fish, large mammals, or particular locales, all conservationists could rally behind
protecting the national park system.
Warnings of a precedent had succeeded in defending Echo Park
and Dinosaur National Monument from a proposed dam during the
1950s. In passing the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act of
1956, Congress rej ected the Echo Park dam and provided that "no dam
or reservoir shall be within any national park or monument." Encoi.uaged by this victory, a coalition including the Wilderness Society, National Parks Association, and Sierra Club, felt confident in protecting
the Colorado and other rivers from future projects that might threaten
areas in the park system. Their warnings of a "precedent" had saved
Echo Park. 3
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Soon after the Echo Park controversy, the precedent strategy was
tested again, this time by the imminent intrusion of Lake Powell into
Rainbow Bridge National Monument in southern Utah. The Rainbow
Bridge battle, caught between the more famous controversies concerning Echo Park and the Grand Canyon dams, has gone relatively unnoticed by historians. In the early 1960s, Rainbow Bridge stood at the
center of a rancorous debate that pitted numerous environmental organizations against the Bureau of Reclamation and the upper ·Colorado
basin states. 4 This time, all warnings to protect an imperiled national
park system failed; after more than a decade of disputes, the waters of
Lake Powell crossed into Rainbow Bridge National Monument. The
precedent strategy that had seemed invincible to its advocates after Echo
Park foundered badly in this case, partly because the likely effects of a
reservoir on the bridge were far less certain than the dramatic impact
that Echo Park dam and reservoir would have had on the canyons of
Dinosaur National Monument. Moreover, possible solutions for protecting the bridge appeared to introduce additional threats to the very
region that environmentalists sought to protect. Therefore, the Rainbow Bridge controversy contributes two important points to the environmental history of the Colorado River. It reveals the weak position
of conservationists operating in the early 1960s, prior to tough environmental laws. Th~ battle's outcome further explains how and why
the Bureau of Reclamation continued to advocate dams in or near portions of the national park system along the Colorado River in the years
that followed.
Rainbow Bridge, a spectacular stone arch with a height of 309 feet
and a span of 278 feet, lies in a small canyon in southern Utah, a few
miles north of the Arizona line. Located on the Navajo Reservation, the
bridge has been known to the Navajo, Paiute, and other Native Americans for centuries. The Navajo consider the bridge sacred, referring to
it as nonnezoshi or "great stone arch." Despite Indians' knowledge of
the bridge and possible sightings by gold miners in Glen Canyon during the 1880s, credit for its "discovery" has traditionally gone to Byron
Cummings, an academic dean at the University of Utah. On 14 August
1909, two Paiute men named Nasja Begay and Jim Mike, who knew the
location of the bridge (at that time located on Paiute lands), escorted
Cummings to the area. Impressed by the spectacular sight, Cummings
published an article on his find in a 1910 issue ofNational Geographic.
On 30 May of that year, President William Howard Taft established
Rainbow Bridge National Monument under the Antiquities Act. 5 The
tiny national monument of 160 acres was but a dot on the map of south-
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ern Utah. For years afterward, the bridge only received a few hundred
visitors per year, primarily due to its extremely remote location and
rugged terrain. Before the presence of Lake Powell, visitors had to hike
seven miles from the Colorado River to reach the bridge.
In the 1950s, Rainbow Bridge entered the public spotlight during
Congressional hearings over the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP).
This project originally called for the construction of several dams in
the upper Colorado basin, including two giant dams at Echo Park inside of Dinosaur National Monument and at Glen Canyon near the Arizona-Utah border. Organizations led by the Wilderness Society, Sierra
Club, and National Parks Association quickly challenged the Echo Park
dam, which they maintained would set a precedent to invade other areas in the park system. They supported an alternative design of the CRSP
that would eliminate Echo Park dam by means of a higher Glen Canyon
dam, thus enlarging Lake Powell and making up for lost storage at Echo
Park. In 1954 and early 1955, David Brower of the Sierra Club was
among those advocating a "high" Glen Canyon dam in order to save
Echo Park. 6
Yet the Bureau of Reclamation and its supporters resisted the alternate proposal for they were determined to include Echo Park dam in
the project. They wanted a large storage reservoir in the northern end
of the upper basin, and they also wished to generate a substantial supply of hydropower close to rapidly growing Salt Lake City and the
Wasatch Front. For their part, Utah ranchers wanted a dam below the
junction of the Green and Yampa rivers in order to capitalize on Utah's
Yampa River rights. 7 Because the specific locale of Echo Park was critical to various interests, the bureau stdutly resisted a "high" Glen Canyon dam and clung to its preferred combination of "low" Glen Canyon
and Echo Park dams. Yet the bureau was not entirely forthcoming about
its rationale, which rested on political as well as technical considerations. Instead, it countered the suggestion for a "high" Glen Canyon
dam with claims that too much water would evaporate from such a reservoir. When David Brower and Richard Bradley demonstrated those
claims to be in error by revealing miscalculations in the bureau's computations, the bureau shifted tactics and argued that the site's geologic
structure might not hold a high dam. Bureau officials insisted, too, that
placing the reservoir behind a high dam would increase the level of
Lake Powell and threaten Rainbow Bridge, located in a small canyon
adjoining Glen Canyon. 8
With the bureau making clear that a second dam and reservoir of
the CRSP threatened another national monument, conservationists now
sought also to protect Rainbow Bridge. Pressed on how this might be
done, bureau officials indicated in a 1955 Congressional hearing that
for relatively little cost-perhaps $3 million-a small barrier dam could
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be constructed in the canyon below the bridge to prevent Lake Powell
from crossing into the monument or coming near the bridge. 9 Eager to
guarantee such protection, Zahniser of the Wilderness Society, who led
the final negotiations to settle the Echo Park controversy, demanded
from lawmakers an appropriate provision in the final CRSP bill. 10
By the end of 1955, it was clear that opponents of an Echo Park
dam would soon triumph, and that the dam would be eliminated from
the legislation expected to pass Congress in early 1956. Accordingly,
the bureau felt that a high Glen Canyon dam must be constructed to
make up for storage and power unavailable from Echo Park. The final
agreement soon fell into place. In exchange for conservationists' support for a high dam at Glen Canyon, upper basin lawmakers included
provisions in the bill that no dam within the CRSP would intrude into
the national park system and that "as part of the Glen Canyon Unit the
Secretary of the Interior shall take adequate protective measures to preclude impairment of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument."11
These provisos capped a seven-year campaign to safeguard the national park system from Colorado River dams. For conservationists the
outcome had been a triumph for all concerned.' The bureau obtained its
high dam with substantially greater storage and power capacity to help
fund the CRSP, while national park defenders gained recognition of
the principle that national park system boundaries must be inviolable.
When President Dwight Eisenhower signed the CRSP into law in April
1956, park defenders rejoiced that they had thwarted the precedent of a
dam intruding into a national monument and strengthened the entire
park system. 12 With the boundaries of two national monuments safeguarded in the 1956 act, they felt confident that threats to the parks
could always be met with the precedent argument. Their confidence
would prove to be misplaced.
While the CRSP act mandated that measures be taken to protect
Rainbow Bridge, no one knew exactly how this was to be accomplished.
When bureau officials first mentioned options during a Congressional
hearing in 1955, they assumed that a barrier dam could be built at relatively little cost and funded within the construction budget for Glen
Canyon dam. 13 At the time, however, the bureau had undertaken only
preliminary field studies. As construction of Glen Canyon .dam progressed in 1957, questions mounted about the location, cost, and potential effects of a barrier dam on the landscape near the bridge. One
critical issue was how much the reservoir would threaten the bridge
without a barrier dam. Would the water level eventually be high enough
to submerge the bridgt? abutments and eventually erode them? Without
a barrier dam, would the bridge collapse after Lake Powell reached capacity?14
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In 1959, two government reports provided answers to these questions that pleased both the bureau and its proponents. In August, the
bureau's regional office in Salt Lake City issued a study stating that
even at its highest level Lake Powell would not reach the bridge abutments and that no barrier dam was needed. 15 In addition, the bureau
preferred not to build a barrier dam, for doing so would delay construction of its showcase project, Glen Canyon dam. Earlier, the National
Park Service (NPS) had predicted that the bureau might reach such a
conclusion and had requested an independent study from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Geologist Wallace R. Hansen, author of the
report appearing in 1959, stated that
there appears to be no valid geologic reason -to fear structural
damage to Rainbow Bridge as a result of possible repeated incursions and withdrawals of reservoir waters to and from the
inner gorge of Bridge Creek beneath the bridge .... it is thus
clear that any possible impairment to the bridge from fluctuating standing water beneath it would be esthetic rather than geologic or structural. 16
Although Hansen's report pleased the bureau, it further dismayed
the Park Service and many conservationists. In the months that followed,
the Sierra Club and its friends cast doubts on Hansen's conclusions and
called for additional studies of the potential effect of the reservoir on
the bridge abutments. Yet to everyone else concerned with the problem, Hansen's report, along with the bureau's study, ended the controversy. Together, the two studies eliminated all concerns about Lake
Powell threatening the bridge abutments and proved that no barrier dam
was needed. Conservationists now faced a daunting challenge; they
needed to persuade Congress to uphold the 1956 law by appropriating
funds for protective structures. So long as the bridge itself faced no
danger from Lake Powell, protecting it appeared to be a waste of taxpayer dollars.
Defenders of the national park system insisted that, although the
threat to the bridge might not exist, intrusion of the reservoir into the
monument was the critical issue. While the bureau and some members
of Congress repeatedly said that only a small sliver of water would enter the monument and downplayed any adverse precedent, conservationists contended that allowing any water to cross the monument
boundary would violate a principle they had fought valiantly to win
during Echo Park. 17 "By allowing Rainbow Bridge National Monument
to remain unprotected, the way may be open for similar invasion of
other Park Service areas," wrote Devereux Butcher, editor of National
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Wildland News .18 In a letter to Arizona Senator Carl Hayden, Butcher
exclaimed "that a violation of principle in one area opens the door to
violation in any and all areas."19 In short, the boundary had to be protected or a dangerous precedent would be set for subsequent cases.
Conservationists' committment to avoid any such precedent not only
grew out of their triumph at Echo Park, but it also reflected their continued anxiety that the threat to Echo Park had not disappeared. 20 Some
residents of Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming had never given up on the
dam, despite years of bitter controversy and the 1956 law that many
believed had permanently settled the issue. While Senator Gordon Allott
of Colorado supported legislation to convert Dinosaur from a national
monument into a national park, his bill permitted the Secretary of the
Interior to survey the new park for dam sites. Regarding this as a scheme
to revive the Echo Park dam project, many conservationists refused to
support the Allott bill and remained wary of any attempt to ignore the
protective measures in the CRSP law. 21
Their fears escalated when Utah Senator Frank Moss sought to
change the law. Beginning in 1960, Moss repeatedly tried to amend the
1956 act to "remove the provisions" intended to protect the bridge. He
believed that those provisions would effectively delay Glen Canyon dam
since the bureau would have to spend valuable time and money building a barrier dam to protect Rainbow Bridge. Moss spoke on behalf of
the bureau as well as water and power consumers in the upper basin
states, all of whom were intolerant of any delay in Glen Canyon dam.
When he denounced the 1956 provision before the Senate, Moss argued that they had emerged "during what amounted to hysteria on the
part of extremist outdoor groups who saw in every man-made pool in a
national monument the impending destruction of the entire national park
system." He accepted the conclusions of the bureau and USGS that even
at its highest level Lake Powell would not touch the bridge abutments,
and therefore he rejected calls for a barrier dam as "a nonsensical and
indefensible waste of the taxpayers' money." In addition, the senator
sneered at conservationists who argued that the entire national park
system would be jeopardized by water crossing the monument's boundary.22
The National Parks Association, Sierra Club, and other groups reacted to Moss' proposed amendment. To them the attempt to alter the
1956 law not only threatened to scuttle an agreement they had worked
hard to achieve, but proved that hopes to build Echo Park dam had not
disappeared, and demonstrated that the sanctity of national park boundaries remained in question. 23 To conservationists, Moss' tampering with
the 19561aw revived the basic issue contested during Echo Park: were
the national parks safe fro.m all intrusions? The victory won at Echo
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Park "is in grave danger," proclaimed the Sierra Club's Outdoor Newsletter in May 1960. "'Break the agreement and invade the National Park
System at Rainbow,' the thinking seems to run, 'and we can do the
same to Echo Park, "'24
The battle for Rainbow Bridge now became entangled with the 1956
law and its proviso requiring protection of the arch. Se~retary of the
Interior Fred Seaton soon became a focal point in the controversy because he was legally responsible for the law's enforcement. Throughout 1959 the Sierra Club, Wilderness· Society, and National Parks
Association urged him to ensure that Lake Powell pose no threat to the
bridge or the monument. In September 1960, the Sierra Club board of
directors asked for Seaton's guarantee that the high water mark of Lake
Powell would be kept below the proposed "site C" for a barrier dam,
while the operation of Glen Canyon dam would not violate the proviso. 25 Seaton eventually opposed Moss' bill, effectively killing its
chances in Congress, and said that the lawmakers had a responsibility
to fulfill the obligations of the 1956 act. 26 He also included $3.5 million in the department's 1961 budget for protecting the bridge. Seaton
then assured David Brower of the Sierra Club that if Congress authorizedfunds the protective dam could be built without disrupting construction of Glen Canyon dam. His moves left conservationists with
hope. 27
Seaton's efforts to uphold the 1956 proviso effectively forced the
bureau to proceed with plans for a barrier dam. Although its own study
had cast doubts on the need for a dam, as long as the 1956 law remained in effect the bureau had no choice but to study the feasibility of
various sites. Eventually several options came forward, each of them
scrutinized carefully by conservationists, the upper basin states, and
members of Congress. The first proposition called for the construction
of an earthen dam along Aztec Creek about three miles below the monument at so-called site "c" to prevent Lake Powell from crossing the
monument boundary. A second option called for two dams, one at site
"A" or "B" downstream from the monument (each closer to the monument than "C"), and a second dam above the monument to keep water
from pouring down upper Bridge Creek into the monument, which otherwise would accumulate and form a reservoir of its own behind the
lower barrier dam. Excess water and rubble at the upper dam would be
pumped and carried away through a tunnel into Lake Powell. 28 A third
strategy proposed only an upstream dam and tunnel, while a fourth suggested the elimination of barrier dams altogether. Of course, this last
possibility could not be exercised unless Congress changed the 1956
law. Conservationists felt confident that Congress would not overturn
its previous decision because Moss' effort to change it had already
failed.
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These options generated intense debate among the bureau, 'upper
basin states, and defenders of Rainbow Bridge. Most conservationists
supported a barrier dam at site "C." In an unusual burst of pro-dam
rhetoric, the Sierra Club called the proposed site and its dam a "brilliant blend of engineering and scenic-resource planning that warrants
giving the Bureau highest praise."29 The Seirra Club applauded site "c"
partly because it wanted construction of the barrier dam to begin as
early as possible and within the construction schedule of Glen Canyon
dam. By January 1960, bridge defenders knew that unless the protective work at site"C" got underway soon, it would be too late to build it
at all, for the site quickly would be inundated once Glen Canyon dam
was completed. 30
Opposition to the barrier dams, however, continued to emerge. Angus Woodbury, a biology professor at the University of Utah, added his
arguments to those made by the bureau and USGS. In a 1960 issue of
Science magazine, Woodbury analyzed the various options for protecting the bridge before concluding that "this is a case which calls for
conservationists to do a little soul searching."31 Woodbury noted that
Lake Powell would be full approximately 13 percent of the time and
that at its highest level the water would stand 40-50 feet below the
bridge abutments. He dismissed site "c" as too expensive and favored
site "B." But Woodbury primarily questioned the need for any barrier
because he thought that the structure would be more damaging to the
area than reservoir water. Construction of barrier dams required roads,
camp sites, and rock excavation, provoking Woodbury to ask: "Should
the present law be enforced and adjacent scenic features be permanently
scarred and injured in order to protect one small but important sector
of the over-all scenic features?"32
Conservationists deeply resented Woodbury's argument, in part
because they remembered that a few years earlier Woodbury had defended Echo Park dam in a Science piece while "referring to national
monuments as 'minor matters. '''33 Then, too, Woodbury had stolen some
of their own rhetoric by building his case on the damage to nature that
would occur if'barrier dams were constructed. Herein lies one of the
great· ironies of the battle. Preservationists, ordinarily of a mind to keep
. "wild" nature pure, demanded barrier dams to safeguard the national
monument, despite their awareness of the effects of such dams on the
lands around the bridge. Supporters of the bureau, usually dubious of
esthetic arguments, denounced all efforts for barrier dams because of
how they would disrupt a beautiful landscape.
Brower later referred to Woodbury's 1960 article as "the initial sin,'~
while Devereux Butcher, editor of National Wildland News, wrote that
it presented "an incomplete picture of the problem" and that Woodbury
ignored "the precedent· involved." Butcher insisted that site "c" re-
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mained the best choice because it would nul1ify the need for a diversion dam and tunnel above the monument and minimize "the impact of
any protective works on the canyons themselves."34 In 1961, Wil1iam
Halliday of Seattle published an extensive rebuttal of Woodbury's piece
in Science. He repeated the familiar arguments of the monument's defenders, raised doubts about the studies of the bureau and USGS, suggested that the bridge might collapse without a barrier dam, favored
site "C," and emphasized the precedent at stake. 35
Despite such efforts the case for the barrier dams continued to
founder. Three different studies of the problem (including Woodbury's)
had concluded that the reservoir posed no threat to the bridge abutments and that barrier dams were not needed. This had raised substantial doubts in Congress about spending millions of dollars unnecessarily.
Meanwhile, the bureau continued to balk at building barrier dams because the cost of such structures had risen tremendously since the middle
1950s. The bureau had initially estimated a single barrier dam at about
$3 million, a contingency cost in building Glen Canyon dam. Subsequent studies of the terrain near the bridge and the engineering and
construction design of such a dam elevated the cost to between $20 and
$25 million, "much greater expenditures of money than were contemplated [in 1956]."36
The higher estimates had proven decisive with members of Congress. In May 1960, the House Committee on Appropriations rejected
the Interior Department's request for $3.5 million of initial funds to
start the protective dam. 37 In its report, the Committee stated that it
"sees no purpose in undertaking an additional expenditure in the vicinity of $20 million in order to build the complicated structures necessary to provide the protection contemplated."38
Most conservationists doubted the new estimates and believed that
the bureau had deliberately elevated the cost in order to convince Congress that a barrier dam was too expensive, thereby reneging on an agreement that it had never intended to keep. Many felt that the bureau had
no desire to divert workers and funds from its showcase dam at Glen
Canyon, and that it had worked assiduously behind the scenes at Interior to scrap the 1956 proviso. 39 They also believed that even at $20 or
$25 million, the cost of a barrier dam was "insignificant," as Anthony
Wayne Smith of the National Parks Association put it, especially considering the much greater "capital value" of a high Glen Canyon dam
in terms of hydropower and storage capacity. In addition, as Smith reminded Pennsylvania Congressman John Saylor, it was the conservationists' acceptance of the high dam in return for the bureau's pledge
to protect Rainbow Bridge that had helped to increase the dam's value. 40
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But there was little they could do except continue to pressure the Secretary of the Interior to uphold the law and protect the bridge, while
trying to persuade the House Appropriations committe to approve funding of a barrier dam.
The latter promised to be difficult. The committee chairman,
Colorado's Wayne Aspinall, had little sympathy for wilderness defenders and those who spoke of a precedent against the park system. Certainly he had done little to preserve Echo Park. In 1960, as Aspinall
was being badgered by Secretary Seaton for funds to protect the bridge,
he decided that the controversy called for an inspection of the place at
the center of the debate. He supported a trip to the bridge by two committee members, Congressmen Saylor of Pennsylvania and Stewart Udall
of Arizona. Their journey to Rainbow Bridge in August 1960 proved
decisive. 41
While Saylor viewed the barrier dam sites from a helicopter, Udall
traveled by boat from Hite, Utah downstream to the mouth of Forbidding Canyon, then hiked seven miles up to the bridge. Udall spent three
hours around the bridge, becoming acquainted with the great span of
rock and its magnificent setting. He climbed to the top of the bridge to
survey the situation from the best vantage point; after descending, he
hiked about one mile up Bridge Canyon to inspect the terrain and watercourse. 42 This Arizona Congressman, who became a key figure in
the controversy, was awed by the canyon country of southern Utah. In
Russell Martin's words, he became mesmerized "by the whole wild
wonder of the place."43 In his summary letter to Aspinall, Udall outlined three options for protecting the bridge, the first two of which included barrier dams above and below the bridge. Udall, however,
favored a third option: "to do nothing-to suffer the intrusion of the
lake as the lesser of evils."44 Udall knew the argument of keeping the
reservoir out of the monument, but like Woodbury he could not escape
the conclusion that barrier dams would scar the landscape with roads,
trails, and construction sites. "It is plain," he wrote Aspinall, "that thrusting a road into the wild canyons which surround the Monument would
change the primitive status of Rainbow."45 Employing a phrase commonly used throughout the controversy, the "cure" of a barrier dam
would be worse than the "disease" of the lake crossing the monument
boundary.46
Udall's letter did not appear in a public forum, but, by reaching
the other members of Aspinall's committee, it effectively put the nail
in the coffin of the barrier dams. Saylor continued to press for funds
for an upstream diversion dam, but Udall's opinion carried greater
weight with many on the committee. Most committee members were
already inclined not to appropriate funds for the protective dams. 47 The
weight of opinion in the House Committee had shifted decidedly in fa-
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vor of scrapping the barrier dams and saving public funds. It now seemed
indisputable that even·a full Lake Powell would not threaten the bridge
abutments and that any protective works and the roads required to build
them would mar the surrounding area far more "than would ever be
done by a finger of water creeping up beneath the 'bridge at certain
periods of the year."48 Members of the House and Senate appropriations committees now translated these tenets as gospel: the bridge was
not threatened and a barrier dam was not needed. Arizona Senator Barry
Goldwater, who had been a partner in Rainbow Lodge located at the
trail head to the bridge, insisted that nature itself would protect the
arch after Glen Canyon dam was finished; he asserted that silt accumulation in the canyon downstream from the bridge (evident iq many side
canyons near Lake Mead) would prevent Lake Powell from passing
under the bridge. 49
That Udall had taken a decisive role in the controversy soon became more than a little ironic. In 1961, Udall became John F.Kennedy's
new Secretary of the Interior. Suddenly Udall found himself in charge
of the Bureau of Reclamation and National Park Service and poised at
the center of the Rainbow Bridge conflict. Only six months earlier he
had recommended against the construction of barrier dams;' as Secretary, he now faced significant pressure from preservationists to obtain
funds from Congress and see that the dams be built. Personally convinced that they were unnecessary and would do more harm than good,
Udall had to weigh his own convictions as well as pressure from the
bureau and its constituents against mounting demands from defenders
of the park system, all while adjusting to the daunting job of Secretary
of the Interior. It was no easy task.
As a representative from Arizona, Udall had always appreciated
the role of water in general and the Colorado River in particular in the
West's economic growth. He had backed the Echo Park dam and the
Bureau of Reclamation enthusiastically, and he had looked fondly on
those projects that provided
water and power to Arizona and the South,
west. On the other hand, he appreciated parks and wilderness areas,
and he later came to respect leading preservationists such as Brower
and Zahniser. As one scholar has observed, Udall assumed his position
at a time when conservation was "a movement in flux," when traditional resource management agencies like the bureau held great importance politically and economically at the same time that preservationism
and "environmentalism" were emerging into the political arena as never
before. 50
That larger context made itself felt in the Rainbow Bridge dispute.
InJanuary 1961, Udall called a special evening meeting at the Interior
Department office in Washington, D.C., to spotlight the importance of
the controversy. In attendance were NPS Director Conrad Wirth, Bu-
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reau Commissioner Floyd Dominy, Assistant Secretary for Water and
Power Kenneth Holum, and Interior Department Solicitor Frank Barry.
Aware of the powerful pressures from both sides, Udall said that the
problem of the bridge raised "very serious questions of conservation
policy."5J While the meeting did not produce a settlement, Udall did
suggest what seemed to him an excellent solution: to enlarge the
monument's boundaries by means of a land exchange with the Navajo
tribe, with hopes of then persuading Congress to transform it into a
national park encompassing at least 200 square miles of land east of
the Colorado River in southern Utah. "As I see it," Udall told the gathering, "this bridge sets [sic] in a marvelous setting, with Navajo Mountain, the sacred mountain of the Navajos, as a back drop [sic], with
some wonderful rugged country on all sides. And it seems to me that
the real park is not the square box-like 160 acres. It is the whole area."52
His idea was to appease conservationists by recognizing their adoration of the canyon country, while gaining from them a promise not to
push for the barrier dams. Udall also.believed that, because the lands
surrounding the bridge had little or no grazing potential, the Navajo
might be interested in obtaining more economically promising lands in
exchange. 53 Pending the outcome of that effort, everyone realized that
political pressures would determine the outcome of the battle.
Certainly Udall could not ignore the bureau and upper basin states
who eagerly anticipated completion of Glen Canyon dam and all that it
promised for recreation, hydropower, and storage of Colorado River
water. By 1961 the dam was rising as a massive construction project in
northern Arizona, with more than 2,000 men working on it in three shifts
a day. Every hour workers poured 300 cubic yards of concrete, building the dam that ultimately would contain ten million tons of concrete.
By the summer of 1961, the structure reached 250 feet above bedrock.
The major contractor, Merritt--':Chapman & Scott, was scheduled to complete the dam by the spring of 1964 at a cost of $107 million. Meanwhile, the new town of Page near the dam hummed with activity,
swarming with construction workers, contractors, and federal employees, and filling up with new stores and homes. 54
Wanting to leave no doubt in Udall's mind about the importance of
the dam's 'swift completion, bureau commissioner Dominy reminded
Udall that Lake Powell must be full for proper financing of the CRSP
since power revenues from Glen Canyon dam would pay for many other
projeCts. "The entire economic feasibility of the billion dollar Colorado River Storage Project," Dominy wrote, "depends upon storing sufficient water in Glen Canyon Reservoir to permit power operations at
the earliest possible date."55
.
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Udall's background and sympathy for water development made most
conservationists skeptical of his commitment to protecting the parks
from intrusions, and some doubted that he had sufficient backbone to
stand up to the bureau. 56 His rejection of a barrier dam from his own·
reconnaissance added to their fear that he would simply go along with
the bureau's plans. Nevertheless, as Interior Secretary, he had a legal
obligation to carry out the protective tenets of the 1956 law, and they
badgered him repeatedly to do so. 57 Rapid construction of Glen Canyon
dam made them increasingly anxious about Rainbow Bridge, and they
looked to Udall to confront the bureau and carry out the 1956 agreement. 58
In February 1961, representatives of a dozen major groups, including the National Parks Association, Wilderness Society, Izaak Walton
League, and Wildlife Management Institute, called on Secretary Udall.
They reminded him of the 1956 proviso and warned that allowing water to cross the boundary would be "a fundamental violation of the law
and the spirit [underlying] the National Park System."59 They urged him
to include in his budget proposal to Congress a request for the barrier
dam and insisted that such a dam must be constructed regardless of
cost, even if it meant that power consumers would pay higher rates. In
December 1961, Brower implored Udall to uphold the law:
Rainbow is a tough one but we are counting on you to put in
for the appropriation so the conservationists can fight for it.
Fred Seaton tried once but didn't get the bureaus (NPS and Reclamation) to support him. You tried once-but this only 'evened
up' you might say, for your earlier view expressed in the letter
to Wayne. Stew, I don't think you have any choice but to do
your damnedest to carry out the law and the agreement. Your
fondest hopes will fade and your just place in history will vanish if you stop fighting for this one. I think there are a lot of
eyes watching this one ....60
Brower hoped that "a lot of eyes" were watching the situation in Washington, D.C. because the Sierra Club and other wilderness watchdogs
had their eyes fixed on Glen Canyon, and they wanted to draw public
attention to what they considered to be a tragedy in the making. By the
early 1960s, the Sierra Club and its allies had come to regret that Glen
Canyondam was rising out of the bedrock of the Colorado River. While
they had not opposed the dam during the 1950s because Glen Canyon
was not within the national park system, many began to realize the stunning beauty soon to be lost beneath Lake Powell. Sierra Club river trips
into Glen Canyon in the late 1950s had raised awareness of its magnificence and caused many to regret that more had not been done to fight
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the dam. In 1963, the Sierra Club published The Place No One Knew, a
coffee-table book filled with photographs of Glen Canyon which became a memorial to the canyon. 61 Conservationists' anguish over the
loss of Glen Canyon was compounded by their conviction that the dam
was not needed for storage or power and was merely a technical means
to fulfill provisions of the Colorado River Compact. "The unnecessary
loss of Glen Canyon," Brower wrote Udall in 1963, "is an epitome of
what man is doing in many places ... [a sign of] the increasing load
man is placing upon his environment to produce transitory benefit to
the market economy. "62
Their sorrow over Glen Canyon sparked a vigorous defense of the
dam by Commissioner Dominy. In a colorful pamphlet published by
the Department of the Interior shortly after the dam's completion,
Dominy claimed that the dam and reservoir had opened a remote and
inaccessible desert wilderness for all to see. "Sired by the muddy Colorado in magnificent canyon country, a great blue lake has been born in
the West," he proclaimed. "It is called Lake Powell."63
The debate concerning Lake Powell contributed to the discussion
about the beauty and accessibility of Rainbow Bridge. Opponents of
the barrier dams made much of its remoteness. On this point conservationists were highly vulnerable, for access to the bridge had long been
limited by its location, which required a twenty-four-mile ride by mule
or a fourteen-mile round trip hike. But the picturesque arch would soon'
be accessible to thousands who could boat along Lake Powell and reach
the bridge in less than one mile's walk, assuming no barrier dams were
constructed. Indeed, opposition to the barrier dams played into an argument for helping people see the bridge. Lake Powell would not "affect the majesty of the bridge," several Congressmen intoned in letters
to their constituents. "In fact, the presence of the lake will make it possible for a larger number of Americans to see one of their natural wonders.,,64 In 1963 Wayne Aspinall's letter to the editor (ghost written by
Dominy) appeared in the Rocky Mountain News: "[Perhaps] the encroachment of part of the lake under the bridge or on the monument
area [means that] a policy has been violated to a certain extent, n,yvertheless, this wonderful and famous cultural monument will now be more
readily accessible to the millions, rather than the hundreds, who have
been privileged to enjoy its grandeur up to the present time."65
This notion dovetailed nicely with the tenet that the distinctive
beauty of the bridge would actually be improved by a sliver of reservoir beneath it. How better to flatter a great stone arch than to provide
it with its own reflective pool? To improve on nature's own beauty by
means of an artificial lake had a tradition of its own. During the debate
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over Hetch Hetchy in the early twentieth century, supporters of the dam
proclaimed that a lake would add luster and beauty to an already sublime scene. In 1913, Harvard historian Albert Bushnell Hart recalled
his visit to the Yosemite Valley the previous year: .
the one thing which seemed to be necessary to make the scenery perfect was a lake on the bottoms .... I have not been in
the Hetch Hetchy Valley, but if it is at all like the Yosemite I
should like to join some society the purpose of which was to
have a dam built, so that the water might be set back to form a
beautiful lake; and strange as it may seem, a reservoir may be
as beautiful as a natural lake. 66
Similar rhetoric had emerged during Echo Park and appeared again in
the Rainbow Bridge debate. Utah Senator Frank Moss maintained that
"a sliver of water backing up into [the monument] would add greatly to
its scenic lure," and make the remote bridge more accessible to boaters. Commissioner Dominy was quoted by one reporter as saying "in
my opinion, the water up under the bridge would make it a more beautiful sight." If the lake would enable more people to see the bridge and
add to the scenery, then it seemed important that it should cross the
monument boundary,67
These arguments about improving nature's own beauty and making
the bridge accessible reflected the weakness of the conservationists'
precedent case. That Congress had not been persuaded by that argument only encouraged opponents of the barrier dams to proclaim the
benefits of Lake Powell to the bridge. Yet the question remains why
Congress had not been persuaded by warnings of an adverse precedent
in the case of Rainbow Bridge when that very same tactic had succeeded
in preserving Echo Park.
Rainbow Bridge presented a very different situation from that of
Echo Park. Most importantly, the likely effect of Echo Park dam on the
scenic character of Dinosaur National Monument had been clear. The
monument's reservoir would have inundated two-thirds of the 800-feethigh Steamboat Rock in Echo Park, and would have reached another
forty to sixty miles upstream through the Lodore and Yampa river canyons. Conservationists repeatedly brought to light this proposed massive alteration of nature in articles and photographs in the Sierra Club
Bulletin, Living Wilderness, National Parks Magazine, and other publications. 68 In doing so, they appealed to what historian Alfred Runte
has called "the nation's historical prejudice for monumental scenery. "69
By contrast, several studies demonstated that Lake Powell posed no
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threat to Rainbow Bridge (though some conservationists doubted those
studies). Since the scenic heart of the monument would be untouched,
the precedent argument carried little weight. Only if a dramatic alteration of nature were likely to occur could that rhetoric take hold.
With the arch being the. sole scenic spectacle inside the monument,
this left the. boundary as the primary point of contention. In the past
conservationists had protected park and, monument boundaries successfully by warning that lines on the map designating such areas must not
be crossed; this simple doctrine had been effective in rallying the public. Yet the boundary line surrounding Rainbow.Bridge did not seem to
matter much to anyone except the conservationists, for as Udall and
Woodbury recognized Rainbow Bridge was a tiny dot on the map in a
vast landscape of slickrock, a speck amidst a huge wilderness of red
rock desert. As Udall put it in his letter to Aspinall, "the natural setting
of Rainbow embraces a much larger area than ·the box-like artificial
'monument' ."70
This topographical reality made the conservationists' focus on the
monument's boundaries appear misguided. They seemed to imply that
"pristine nature" resided only inside those boundaries while the landscape beyond them was not worth protecting. Passionate about protecting the 160-acre monument, its defenders would sanction roads, trails,
and a tunnel on the stunning landscape around it, "hardly in keeping
with the wilderness concept," as a Salt Lake Tribune editorial put it. 71
Politically, their .case was weak: Once the threat to the bridge abut"
ments had been settled, the crossing of the boundary by Lake Powell
seemed less a violation of principle than a trivial point. IUhe bridge
was not threatened, why worry about a sliver of water crossing the
boundary line? Most members of the House' Committee did not worry
about that prospect and portrayed themselves as fiscally responsible
and mindful of taxpayers' money. 72
Here, then, was the situation facing Secretary Udall as the bridge
controversy crested in 1962 and 1963. Ever since his own visit to the
bridge, Udall firmly believed that barrier dams should be av.oided. Further, he had hoped to turn attention away from them with his proposal
of enlarging Rainbow Bridge National Monument and converting it into
a spectacular new park. This plan, however, soon foundered, for the
Navajo had refused to surrender their land surrounding the bridge. They
resisted in part because Navajo Mountain was a sacred place to them,
and because Norman' Littell, a legal adviser of the tribe in Washington,
D.C. and a nemesis of Udall, advised against the secretary's proposed
land' exchange. His park idea going nowhere, and criticism from conservationists mounting, from 1961 to 1963 Udall requested funds from
Congress for barrier dams in the Interior budgets. 73
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The secretary acted knowing that Congress would refuse the request, just as it had done in 1960. He knew the sentiments of the House
Appropriations Committee,having recently been a member, and he knew
of both Aspinall's and Senate chairman Carl Hayden's determination
to turn such requests down. 74 As he predicted, Congress said, "no." In
1961 and 1962 Congressional committees from both the House and
Senate wrote their own provisions in the Interior budget bills, specifically stating that no money appropriated for the CRSP could be used to
build dams to protect Rainbow Bridge. 75 The committees opposed such
spending because of the higher estimated costs of barrier dams, and
because members believed that additional roads and dams would mar a
remote and spectacular place: Predictably, conservationists responded
that "it appears inconsistent for the Congress on one hand to direct initiation of a program but, on the other hand, to deny the funds necessary
to implement it. Failure to provide the protective measures abrogates
the law and the agreement which conservationists accepted in good
faith. "76
Conservationists' only hope now rested on an important legal question: could Congress renege on the 1956 law simply by denying the
appropriations? In 1963, Frank J. Barry, Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior, ruled that such a legal precedent did exist, that Congress
could and had done so, and that Secretary Udall need not feel compelled to protect the bridge. 77 "Under the present state of the law applicable to Glen Canyon," Barry wrote in a memorandum to Udall, "it is
the intention of the Congress that construction and filling of the Reservoir should proceed on schedule without awaiting the construction of
barrier dams at Rainbow Bridge. "78 The Sierra Club and other groups
quickly denounced Barry's ruling. David Brower consulted several attorneys who rejected Barry's argument that Congress could nullify a
law simply by denying appropriations. 79 Meanwhile, the Sierra Club,
Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, and National Parks Association
filed suit in federal district court to require Secretary Udall to keep the
diversion tunnels at Glen Canyon dam open until protective measures
for· Rainbow Bridge were built. 80
In a ruling that revealed the weakness of the conservation lobby in
the early 1960s, the court held that the plaintiffs had no legal standing
to bring suit. The court also ruled that the 1956 law remained in effect
and that the Secretary of the Interior was responsible for deciding
whether or not to uphold it. Udall, mindful of Barry's ruling as well as
the powerful pressures to finish Glen Canyon dam, decided not to.
The bridge controversy continued to play out in the legal system
into the early 1970s. In 1972, Brower, then president of Friends of the
Earth, filed a federal suit against the bureau and Secretary of the Interior in federal court to enforce the 1956 proviso. This time, Judge Willis
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Ritter ruled from a federal court in Utah that the 1956 act must be upheld-that the Department of the Interior must operate Glen Canyon
dam so as to keep Lake Powell sufficiently low to prevent damage to
Rainbow Bridge or build a protective dam to keep water from entering
under the bridge. 8 ! But a U.S. Court of Appeals later overturned Ritter's
decision by ruling that the 1956 proviso had been effectively nullified
because Congress had refused to appropriate funds for protecting the
.bridge for sixteen years. Richard Leonard, an attorney and Sierra Club
leader, disagreed with the appellate court ruling and remained hopeful
that the Supreme Court would reverse that ruling and protect the bridge
in the end. Leonard's hopes had been raised by another suit brought by
the Wilderness Society against the Alaska Pipeline in which a court
had said that "repeal of a clear act of Congress could not be accomplished by implication." However, in 1974 the Supreme Court declined
to review the appellate decision. 82 In the end, Lake Powell lapped beneath the. great bridge without touching the abutments.
The story of the Rainbow Bridge controversy is significant in a
number of ways. Perhaps most importantly, it reveals the weakness of
the conservation lobby prior to the legal revolution in environmental
affairs instigated by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. '
Without sufficient legal mean~ to protect the bridge, defenders of the
park system could only fall back on a rhetorical strategy that proved
ineffective in a situation much different than Echo Park. They discovered that a precedent against the national park system could not stir the
public as easily as they had assumed.
By contrast, the Bureau of Reclamation and the hydropower lobby
had considerably more influence in Congress and along the Colorado
River. From the bureau's vantage point, the controversy had a positive
outcome. As a result of conservationists' failure to protect the bridge
with a barrier dam, the bureau realized that the precedent argument could
fail when the perceived effects of a dam or reservoir were not dramatic.
The bureau now understood that the argument's strength depended upon
the degree of impact of the dam and reservoir in question, not on con~
servationists' legal protests. Confident that the precedent argument
could be overcome, the bureau in the early 1960s proposed two more
dams inside the Grand Canyon; this time at Marble and Bridge Canyons. Neither dam would be placed inside Gran'd Canyon National Park
or Monument but just outside their boundaries, and thus neither could
be considered an intrusion within a protected area. While their effects
on changing th,e flow of the Colorado River might well be questioned,
conservationists carried the responsibility of determining whether such
alterations could pose a precedent against the national park system. Their
eventual deCision that it could leads into another story. In revealing the
weakness of the precedent strategy, the outcome at Rainbow Bridge
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strengthened the bureau's influence on the Colorado River and helped
spark the ensuing controversy over the Grand Canyon dams. The battle
for Rainbow Bridge was thus a key episode in the history of the Colorado River, an essential link between the more famous controversies
over Echo Park and the Grand Canyon.
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